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Notwithstanding the famous dictum of Oliver Wendell
Holmes,1 the life of the law has very often been logic as well as
experience. A legal principle tends, as Cardozo put it, "to expand
itself to the limit of its logic," 2 and a monster, once created, will
act according to the rules of its monstrous nature. Fortunately for
humankind, this process results in the accentuation of internal in-
consistencies, so that there is a fair chance of the monster's ultimate
self-destruction.
Judge Higginbotham has traced in scholarly detail the way in
which that most formidable monster, slavery in North America,
developed as a legal structure, taking as his fields of study the
colonies of Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Pennsylvania. He then discusses the decisions of the
English courts in the colonial and post-colonial period, with par-
ticular reference to the decision of Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice
of the King's Bench, in Somerset v. Stewart3 and the later cases
that worked out its implications. Finally, he considers the effect of
the Revolution, and of the words of the Declaration of Independ-
ence, upon public attitudes toward slavery. Throughout the book,
the reader is made conscious of Judge Higginbotham's awareness of
the application of law in the courtroom both by his analysis of the
underlying meaning of statutes, and his appreciation of the im-
portance of procedural law in determining the extent of the dis-
abilities imposed upon a depressed social group. Again and again
we meet with colonial legislation that not only imposed direct dis-
abilities upon slaves (and indeed, -upon black people generally),
f Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. LL.B. 1953, LL.M.
1958, Ph.D. 1969, London University.
I "The life of the law has not been logic: it ]as been experience." O.W.
HoLuMs, TnE CoMMoN LAw 1 (1881).
2B. CAnDozo, THE NATuIE OF THE JuflICIAL PnocEss 51 (1932), quoted in
A.L. HIcGnSBoTrAM, IN TM MATER OF COLOR 383-84 (1978).
320 How. St. Tr. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772), discusssed in A.L. IhGin-
BOTHAm, supra note 2, at 313-68.
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but also effectively deprived them of such rights as remained by
denying them the right to give evidence against white people or by
imposing upon them the onus of proof of their free condition.
(Moreover, those who failed to meet this burden of proof were
often severely punished.) At the same time, as we read, we are
made aware of the absurdities, as well as the cruelties, to which
this legislation gave rise; and of the impossibility of logically recon-
ciling slavery as a legal institution with ordinary human relation-
ships, or even with slavery itself as an economic institution.
The author's technique of approaching this material through
the histories of six different colonies, all with different origins,
modes of settlement, and ways of life, has been very fruitful; for it
becomes clear that slavery was not a single, consistent institution
throughout the colonies, but manifested itself differently in differ-
ent societies, despite the existence of racial and legal assumptions
common to the colonies in general. Behind all these differences,
there can be detected, in varying degrees of emphasis, the influence
of legal and administrative institutions of the Old World, and par-
ticularly of England. Perhaps the most obvious of these, to his-
torically minded lawyers of the time, was the system of villeinage,
by which rural life was governed throughout most of Europe dur-
ing the Middle Ages.4  It may be doubted, however, whether this
system really had much influence in America in the formative
period of the slave-holding society, for it had by then shrunk to the
status of a legal curiosity in England, discussed by writers such
as Coke 5 for its traditional rather than its actual importance. Of
far greater probable significance was the concept of the indentured
servant, who was bound to serve his master for a set term of years.6
Another prevalent institution, whose influence was perhaps less
obvious, was the English Poor Law,7 under which each parish was
4 See A.L. I-cGmBOTHAm, supra note 2, at 322-23, 339-41. For a general
description of the system of villeinage, including a compilation of the laws govern-
ing it, see E. Conx, 1 FIRST INsTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 172-212
(-402-38).
5 Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), author of Institutes of the Laws of England,
cited in A.L. HIGGINBoTHAm, supra note 2, at 322. See note 4 supra.
6 A.L. h1IGGINoTm.d, supra note 2, at 392-95.
7 The English Poor Law, which had its origins in the social and economic up-
heavals of the sixteenth century and which survived until the mid-twentieth, is
actually a series of laws passed to provide a system of relief for the poor. Methods
of relief used by communities to aid the poor were first codified in the Poor Relief
Acts of 1597, 39 Eliz. 1, c. 3, and of 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2. The latter statute pro-
vided the foundation of English Poor Law by requiring parishes to levy taxes on
occupiers of property within their bounds in order to provide for the poor. M. RosE,
THE ENGLISH PooR LAw 1780-1930, at 11 (1971). See generally E. LEONARD, THE
EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF (1965); I G. NrcnoLuS, A HISTORY oF
THm ENGLISH PooR LAw (rev. ed. 1904).
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obliged to maintain its own paupers out of public funds, with the in-
evitable corollary that each parish was concerned to see that no one
else's paupers made their homes in it.8 This tradition seems to have
been particularly strong in New York, whose legislature early began
to limit the master's right to manumit slaves, lest by doing so he
should shift onto the public funds the burden of maintaining them
in their old ageY
As the author reveals, the white colonists were not entirely
oblivious to the inherent contradictions of slavery. Events con-
stantly forced them
to confront the basic flaw in all systems of subjugation.
There can be no successful, peaceful coexistence between
master and slave: between those who are always considered
human and those beings who are sometimes animal some-
times human, who are sometimes bought and sold like
chattel and sometimes able to own chattel, and who are
sometimes bound as perpetual slaves and sometimes free.10
Nevertheless, the cases that he cites show that despite these in-
equalities, peaceful coexistence sometimes could be maintained,
although never with complete consistency. Physical infirmity from
time to time compelled, or indolence enticed, slave owners to rely
upon the ministrations of slaves to such an extent that the slaves
came to exercise responsibility for the affairs of the masters, and
even to have power over them. So, we have the case of Captain
Davis, of Georgia, in 1739, who had "'contracted such Distempers,
as well nigh bereft him of the Use of both his Legs and Arms,'
and whose mulatto slave woman "'was of much Use to him; not
only as a Helper to put on his Cloaths . . .but ...he suffered
almost every Thing to pass through her Hands, having such Con-
fidence in her, that she had the Custody of all his Cash, as well
as Books ... .' 11
Similarly, there was the case of the landlord in South Carolina
in 1715 who, when he tried to enter upon his tenant's plantation,
was opposed by the tenant's slaves. When he threatened "' to
8 This concern was codified in the Poor Relief Act, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2 c. 12,
"which gave powers to parish overseers, on complaint to justices, to return to their
parish of settlement any newcomers to the parish who had no legal settlement within
it" M. ROSE, supra note 7, at 12.
9 See A.L. HIGGNBmoTHAm, supra note 2, at 128-30.
10 Id. 82.
114 CoLONu m BEConDs OF GEoRGrA 344 (A. Candler ed. 1906), qu6ted in A.L.
fI-GrnaoTHAM, supra note 2, at 231.
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break their heads,' " they told him that if "'he .. .attempted any
such thing they would break [his] head again and gave [him] other
bold and threatening language.' "12 Whatever the legal theory, it
can hardly be supposed that any master would be otherwise than
grateful to slaves who manifested their loyalty in this way, even
though it amounted to offering violence to another white man.
Indeed, employment of slaves as bodyguards seems to have been a
feature of all slave-holding societies and was evidently a common
practice in those colonies in which, as the author points out, wealthy
persons were habitually accompanied by a large retinue of slaves
and gained social prestige from being so escorted. 13 On the other
side of the coin, the master's dependence upon the loyalty of domes-
tic slaves gave rise to a fear of poisoning or arson at their hands,
manifested in statutes and court decisions in the colonial period.14
The materials described by the author suggest that the racial
basis of slavery in North America and the West Indies was not
explicit at the beginning. Judge Higginbotham is probably right
in his explanation that "national consciousness favouring the Eng-
lishmen could loosely be translated to racial consciousness disfa-
vouring blacks"; 'r but in fact the Old World institutions that
influenced early colonial courts and legislatures may provide more
definite clues about the causes of the evolution of racial prejudice
and may thus be of value in analyzing the causes of such prejudice
even today. We need to bear in mind that the concept of slavery
that the early settlers brought with them was based on religion
rather than race, and was concerned primarily with the treatment
of prisoners of war. In the Old World, Christians or Muslims who
captured co-religionists would hold them as security for payment
of a ransom, but not enslave them.' 6 It follows that enslavement
would be regarded principally as a means of forcing the conversion
of captured "infidels." It has also to be remembered that this was
not a one-sided practice at the time in question. The seventeenth
century was still an age of Turkish military aggression,' 7 and of
1 2 
REcoDs OF THE COURT OF CHLNCERY OF SouTH CMior.iZ 1671-1779, at
123 (A. Gregorie ed. 1950), quoted in A.L. II-BoTHAM, supra note 2, at 210.
13 See, e.g., A.L. HIGGMINOTHAm, supra note 2, at 117.
14 These concerns are particularly apparent in the provisions of the Georgia
Slave Codes, cited in A.L. IGIcBoTHA , supra note 2, at 256, 262-63; and in the
South Carolina statutes, cited in id. 181-82, 198, 205.
15 Id. 29.
16 See F. DE VICTOIA, DE INDIS ET DE IUBE BELL REFL CioNES pt. II, see.
II, para. 42 (Lyons 1557); H. GRnons, DE IURE BEL1 AC PAcIs bk. III, ch. VII,
pt. IX (Paris 1625).
17See J. SToYE, TIE SiNxE oF VmNmA (1964).
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widespread coastal raids by pirates from North Africa.18 Within
the area of Europe and the Mediterranean, moreover, racial dif-
ferences between continguous communities were slight enough for
captives who had adopted the religion and customs of their captors
and who had been manumitted in consequence, to be readily as-
similated into the community.
In America, these concepts were applied from the earliest times
to relations with the Indians: in fact Columbus himself seems to
have been an exponent of the art of provoking "just wars" with a
view to obtaining Indian slaves, 19 just as the legislators of Massa-
chusetts in 1641 permitted the enslavement of "lawful Captives
taken in juste warres." 20 There could, however, be no serious
question of Negro slaves having this status, as far as Europeans were
concerned, even though many if not most of them had probably
been taken prisoner by other Africians in wars exacerbated by the
slave trade itself. As long as the original concept of slavery re-
mained, however, the courts and legislatures of the colonies were
embarrassed, as the author shows,2 1 by the problem of the slave who
was baptized and therefore, if the principle was applied logically,
earned his freedom; for the whole point of importing slaves from
Africa south of the Sahara was to gain a supply of cheap labor, paid
for as merchandise, and not a chance to convert "infidels." In these
circumstances, the shift to a racial basis for slavery can be seen as
almost inevitable, because a racial basis premised the system of
slavery upon the one criterion that the victim could never change
by his own efforts and that (in contrast to the situation of the Old
World) provided a ready means of distinction between one class
and the other. With this shift, it was therefore necessary to con-
struct a theory of racial superiority in order to justify the system;
we can see how, by the end of the seventeenth century, the change
of concepts had been made and was manifesting itself in legal
18See L. WiuGuT & J. MACLEOD, TE FoST A cANs n, NoRTH AFmc,
10-14 (1945).
19 See S. DE MADAmIAGA, CHBISTOPHER COLUMBUS 270-345 (1940).
20 BODY OF LIBERTIES, 1641 § 91, reprinted in CoLoNLIA LAWS OF MASSA-
CHUSETTS BEP. FROM 1660 Surp. TO 1672, at 53 (1889), quoted in A.L. HIGGiN-
BOTHAm, supra note 2, at 62.
21 The problem of justifying the continued enslavement of blacks who were or
became Christians is a recurrent theme throughout Higginbotham's analysis. See,
e.g., A.L. HIGGINBOTHAW! supra note 2, at 21, 25-26, 36-37, 127-28, 200-01.
Colonial legislatures and courts acknowledged the issue as problematic but always
concluded that blacks ought to "be saved by Christ but never free from their
masters." Id. 128. A related theme is the equally troublesome attempt by con-
scientious colonists, such as Patrick Henry, to reconcile the practice of slavery with
their own Christian beliefs. See id. 378-79.
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theory.22  This theory of racial superiority became so thoroughly
established, even in the minds of those opposed to the institution
of slavery, that in the centuries which followed, convinced aboli-
tionists could hardly conceive of admitting black people to political
equality with white people.23 Indeed, one of the most striking pe-
culiarities of the American way of life, to observers from other
nations, is that despite all the progress that has been made in out-
lawing racial discrimination, even the most liberal-minded of Ameri-
cans continue to classify people as "black" or "white" according to
the theory of slavery and government agencies still require one's race
to be stated on official forms.
The author's insights as a judge and as a practicing courtroom
lawyer, and his skill in thinking himself into the minds of lawyers
of a past age, serve him well throughout the volume. His talents are
particularly evident in his treatment of Somerset v. Stewart,24 in
which Lord Mansfield held that the master of an escaped Negro
slave was not entitled to recapture him in England and ship him
out of the country. The arguments of counsel are set forth and
analyzed in some detail,25 in order to elucidate the reasoning of
the court and to emphasize the significance of the decision at the
time. Unfortunately, the author has been less successful in his
treatment of some of the other English cases, and there are errors in
the text (particularly in the Latin citations) 26 that occasionally pro-
duce absurdities, and that may create impediments to students who
seek, as I hope they will, to follow up what the author has to say
in this interesting field. This review is hardly the place in which
to discuss these errors in detail, but the point may be illustrated by
brief consideration of the author's treatment of The King v. In-
habitants of Thames Ditton.27 This case merits attention both be-
cause a misunderstanding by the author affects his argument, and
because the facts of the case, and its human factors, are of some
interest.
22 Id. 36-38, 80-81, 118, 128.
23 See, e.g., id. 92-98, 139, 143, 147-48, 268-69, 300-02.
2420 How. St. Tr. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772), discussed in A.L. ICGIN-
BoTHAm, supra note 2, at 313-68.
25 A.L. 'fiGGmBOHAm, supra note 2, at 336-48.
26 See, e.g., the substitution of "habeaus corpus" for "Ihabeas corpus," id. 331,
333; the substitution of "Fiat Justitia, ruat coelumtet" for "Fiat Justitia, ruat coelum,"
id. 332, 352; the substitution of "in favorem liberatis" for "in favorem libertatis," id.
333, 339; and the substitution of "Liberate Probanda" for "De Libertate Probanda,"
id. 339, 340.
274 Douglas 300, 99 Eng. Rep. 891 (K.B. 1785), discussed in A.L. IThc-Ian-
BoTHAM, supra note 2, at 357-58.
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The case in question, another decision of Lord Mansfield, in-
volved Charlotte Howe, a black slave brought from America to
England in 1781 by Captain Howe. He took her to live in Thames
Ditton, about twelve miles from the center of London. After her
master's death in 1783, Charlotte was baptized and continued to
live with his widow. Later, the widow moved closer to London,
to the parish of St. Luke's Chelsea, and Charlotte went with her.
After five or six months, however, Charlotte left her mistress and
went back to Thames Ditton. It is at this point that the author
has, excusably, misunderstood what happened and assumed that
Charlotte brought an action against her mistress for wages but had
her claim dismissed by the court on the ground that she was a slave
and not entitled to payment for her labour. The report shows, how-
ever, that what really happened was something quite different. In
fact, the case arose out of one of the numerous squabbles between
parishes as to who should look after a pauper.28 Having left her
mistress, Charlotte was evidently destitute; but the overseers of the
poor in Thames Ditton saw no reason why they should look after
her when she had been living for several months in another parish.
Therefore, they obtained from two justices of the peace an order
that she should be taken back to Chelsea. In true eighteenth-
century Poor Law style, the Chelsea overseers resisted the order and
won their case on the ground that the statute required a pauper
to have a "hiring" in a parish in order to gain a "settlement" there;
because Charlotte had never worked for wages in Chelsea, the parish
of St. Luke's could not be compelled to accept her.29 Presumably
this meant that she was allowed to go back to Thames Ditton, where
she evidently wanted to live, even though she had not worked for
wages there either.
It would be nice to know what happened to her. The Poor
Law had not yet become the ferocious affair that it was in the
days of Dickens, and we may perhaps be entitled to imagine her
with a cottage in that very pleasant village, with the children com-
ing to see her with a kind of awed respect. Here, too, there seems
scope for some research. However this may be, the case is not
authority for the proposition that "while in England a slave was
required to serve his or her master even when the slave had not
been provided for." 80 Under the rule of Somerset, Mrs. Howe
28 See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
29 The King v. Inhabitants of Thames Ditton, 4 Douglas 300, 302, 99 Eng. Rep.
891, 892-93 (K.B. 1785).
so A.L. HI-GNBOTHAM , supra note 2, at 358.
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could not have forced Charlotte to return to slavery in America;
nor under Thames Ditton could she have required Charlotte to go on
working in England without compensation for the rest of her days.
The book can, then, be faulted on points of detail, and on the
interpretation that the author places upon some of his data. Con-
sidering the heroic range of the work, it would indeed be surprising
if this were not the case. If Judge Higginbotham's scholarly work
stimulates further research into the legal origins of Negro slavery,
the responses of courts and legislatures to the presence of a slave
population, and to the problems that the very existence of slavery
posed to other jurisdictions, we may hope that, thanks to him, the
years to come will bring a deeper understanding not only of the
history of slavery as such, but of the racial and social prejudices
which it fostered and which plague us to this day.
